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ABSTRACT
Phishing attacks contribute to a variety of cyber incidents such as data breaches, and ransomware
attacks. These attackers regularly discuss cyber sensitive topics and keywords, share exploits,
and ransomware kits through messages in online forums that act as communities of practice. The
research on correlated cyber risk from phishing attacks is in its infancy. In this research-inprogress paper, we propose a framework for the assessment of phishing risks in an organization
and subsequent mitigation through balanced investments in IT security and complimentary cyber
insurance. First, our framework employs binary classifiers to determine an expert phisher, who
can launch phishing attacks and the misdetection of phishing URLs in an organization. Second,
our framework identifies the optimal cyber insurance premium to indemnify the correlated loss
from undetected phishing attacks. In this manner, the results of this study will assist CTOs to
plan for balanced cybersecurity investments, and guide cyber insurers to design differentiated
insurance products under various risk attitudes of organizations.
Keywords: Information security; dark forums; cyber risk assessment; cyber risk mitigation;
cyber insurance; Copula; utility models.
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INTRODUCTION
Phishing involves social engineering of user data over the Internet to acquire personal and
business information from innocent users. Attackers exploit the user’s susceptibility to deception
(Goel et al., 2017) and trick them to divulge critical information unintentionally (Leukfeldt et al.,
2016; Wright et al., 2014). Such information includes login credentials for social networks,
banking applications, credit cards, and healthcare through emails, corrupt URLs and multimedia
messages.
Recently, phishing attacks have contributed to a variety of secondary cyber disasters: data
breaches, ransomware attacks, business email compromises, tech support frauds, and tax refund
scams (FBI IC3, 2017). In 2017, the FBI received more than 25,344 complaints about phishing
attacks where the victims suffered a combined loss of $720 million. In 2015, the US-CERT
announced a phishing alert for attacks through Kill Disk malware that was delivered via spearphishing emails to power, oil and gas companies in Ukraine (ICS-CERT, 2016). Although
malicious agents execute these attacks through a set of technical steps, security researchers
consider phishing as more of an economic problem than a technological one (Akerlof and
Shiller, 2015). Thus, phishing attacks are a vital concern among organizations that necessitates
immediate attention and proactive intervention from CTOs (APWG, 2017).
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Figure 1. ─ Top firms facing phishing attacks in 2017
Figure 1 shows the number of phishing URLs used by malicious attacks to target users in 2017,
and verified by PhishTank. We noted that (i) hackers targeted naïve customers by fake PayPal
domains and counterfeit tech support messages, (ii) a high number of phishing emails with
technology firm domains such as Facebook, Google, AOL, Microsoft, Apple and Adobe. (iii) the
number of phishing URLs follow a long tail where the number of highly impacted firms are
smaller in number, whereas a large number of firms with minimal impact exist (Anderson,
2008).
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS CORRELATED PHISHING RISK AND
MITIGATION THROUGH CYBER INSURANCE
Theoretical Foundation
According to the Opportunity Theory of Crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979), a phisher needs to
target a gullible victim using Deception (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015) whose IT system does not
have any effective spam filters, or antivirus to block phishing URLs (Hannon, 2002). This is in
line with Social Conflict Theory (Pitcher et al., 1978) where expert attackers and naïve users act
as instigating factors while anti phish filters and perimeter security installations act as inhibiting
factors for phishing attacks (Biswas and Mukhopadhyay, 2016). The Rational Choice Theory
(Ehrlich, 1996) suggests that a phisher will weigh the cyber risks versus returns before executing
an attack. Hence, an accurate estimation of the likelihoods of phisher expertise and efficient
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detection of suspicious URLs is crucial to minimize phishing attacks. Based on the accuracy of
these predictions, CTOs can resort to IT security investments and complimentary cyber
insurance under different risk-taking abilities of a firm (Kahane et al., 1988). Figure 2 shows our
proposed conceptual framework PRAMCI consisting of phishing-risk assessment, followed by
risk mitigation.

Figure 1. – Correlated phishing risk assessment and subsequent mitigation using cyber insurance
Cyber risk assessment for correlated phishing attacks
Cyber risk assessment consists of (i) estimation of expert attackers by mining Darknet messages;
(ii) estimation of the likelihood of phishing attacks; (iii) misdetection of attacks; and expected
loss under correlated misdetection and phishing attacks.
Estimation of expert attackers by mining Darknet messages
Dark forums and hacker communities provide an easy and simple mechanism for malignant
users to share and discuss technical knowledge and distribute malicious source codes and files
(Benjamin and Chen, 2012). We employ binomial logistic regression model to classify into two
hacker roles – “expert” and “novice” (Biswas et al., 2018). Logistic regression can handle such a
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classification problem. We use the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) and it ensures that the
probability of hacker follows

in (1), (2).

(1)
(2)
where X1 , X2 , …… X11 are the predictor variables extracted from hacker messages (Samtani, 2016).
Estimation of the likelihood of phishing attacks
Each of the

organizations out of
th

industrywide standards in

year (

had installed security technologies and complied with
) (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2017). Additionally, they

conducted IT security audits, up-to-date IT security policies (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000),
(Fischer, 2013). Yet

reported intrusion(s) to enforcement agencies and legal counsels
out of

CTOs reported to the CSI-FBI about a cyber-attack in year , while

were not attacked. So,
probability of

has two possible states (i.e., attack:

and

) with a

of phishing with an exponential form that maps the likelihood

to [0, 1]. We consider a lag of one year (i) from the time of security deployment

and impacted users,
two states

or no attack:

respectively, as shown in Eq. (3). The Logit link function

approximates the probability
of attack

CTOs

;

, (ii) between the legal, regulatory factors

, and

.

has

, and fits a binomial distribution.
(3)
(4)

where V1 = β0 + β1 t + β2 Sect-1 + β3 Reg t-1 and pph = likelihood of phishing attacks.
Estimation of the likelihood of misdetection of phishing attacks
The CTO in a bid to prevent the phishing attacks wishes to examine the URLs in emails
(Valecha et al., 2018) based on features such as address-bar, abnormality, HTML/JavaScript, and
web-site statistics. Each of the features is encoded as [-1, 0, +1] for [phishing, suspicious, and
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legitimate] URLs. The CTO intends to classify URLs as phishing (-1) and genuine (+1).
Therefore, the detection of phishing and genuine URLs is a two-class classification problem (5).
(5)
where Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4,…Z30 = URL features (Mohammad et al., 2014).
Expected loss under correlated misdetection and phishing attacks
Once the organization can distinguish between phishing and genuine URLs, it needs to address
the residual cyber risks from the undetected phishing URLs.
(6)
(7)
So, the expected loss

according to Sklar's Theorem (Sklar, 1959) is given by (8).
(8)

where

represents the joint c.d.f. of the expected loss;

continuous marginal c.d.f-s; Copula
unit-square space and

and

are univariate and

describes the link in a two-dimensional

is unique and differentiable;

denotes the correlation between

and . We choose Archimedean Copula for the c.d.f of the joint distribution of E(L) with the
marginal distributions for

and L being exponential (Wolpert, 2000) as shown in (9) and (10).
for

(9)
(10)

Mitigation through complimentary cyber insurance and security technology
We propose a cyber-insurance model built on utility theory (Strecker et al., 2011) to recommend
to the CTOs on possible cyber risk management – transfer outsourced, or in-house (Gordon et
al., 2003; Dhillon et al., 2017). The PRAMCI framework shows that expert hackers could launch
phishing attacks, and CTOs can block those attacks using our proposed phishing filter. If the
filter fails, then the firm faces a possibility to suffer losses. If the CTO has paid a premium (I),
and received L as full indemnification, assuming the cyber-insurance coverage pays him the
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entire loss suffered. However, if there is no cyber-insurance, the CTO suffers a loss L. Even if no
phishing attack occurs, an insured organization would still pay I. Therefore, the CTO compares
between (i) procuring third-party cyber-insurance or (ii) manage the cyber risk on his own. Eqn.
(11) – (13) present the decision-making problem for the organization, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Objective: To find
s.t.

for risk-neutral, risk-averse, and constant-risk types
and

(11)

(12)

(13)
where utility

can take a linear, quadratic or exponential functional form for risk-neutral,

risk-averse, and constant-risk types respectively, and ΔCT = Per unit cost of security.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDY
Through our preliminary study, we explored and built decision-theoretic models to compare the
feasibility of proposing cyber insurance in comparison to complimentary security investments. In
future, we aim to compute the probabilities in (1)-(7) and estimate the parameters of the bivariate
Archimedean copula of E(L) with empirical data. Our initial analysis revealed that E(L) showed
a longer tail than exponential (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2017), with almost four times variance.
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Figure 3. – Decision tree for the insured and uninsured states of an organization
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